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ABSTRACT 
 
In the rules of evidence in all legal jurisdictions, medical experts are required to maintain objectivity 
when providing opinions.  When interpreting medical evidence, doctors must recognise, 
acknowledge and manage uncertainties to ensure their evidence is reliable to legal decision-makers.  
Even in the forensic sciences such as DNA analysis, implicit bias has been shown to influence how 
results are interpreted from cognitive and contextual biases unconsciously operating. In cases 
involving allegations of child abuse there has been significant exposure in the media, popular 
magazines, legal journals and in the published medical literature debating the reliability of medical 
evidence given in these proceedings.  In these cases judges have historically been critical of experts 
they perceived had sacrificed objectivity for advocacy by having an investment in a ‘side’.   This 
paper firstly discusses the issue of bias then describes types of cognitive biases identified from 
psychological research applied to forensic evidence including adversarial bias, context bias, 
confirmation bias and explains how terminology can influence the communication of opinion.   It 
follows with previously published guidelines of how to reduce the risk of bias compromising 
objectivity in forensic practices then concludes with my own recommendations of practices that can 
be used by child protection paediatricians and within an organisation when conducting forensic 
evaluations of suspicious childhood injury to improve objectivity in formulation of opinion evidence.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE OF BIAS 
Within the rules of evidence in all legal jurisdictions, medical experts are required to maintain 
objectivity when formulating opinion
1
.  In the courtroom legal advocates use cross-examination to 
expose bias if it is present.  In contrast to explicit bias which is part of a person’s conscious 
awareness such as generalised assumptions based on age, gender or race, implicit bias is one that an 
individual holds without being aware, and is therefore more difficult to acknowledge or control.  
Making decisions under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty is fundamental to being a 
professional. Every evidence-based decision is fundamentally a risk decision
2
. How doctors respond 
to uncertainty in medical evidence will influence reliability of opinions given in legal settings.  The lay 
person may erroneously assume that science always holds definitive and reliable answers. It can be 
argued that science is a fluid concept, with new techniques and approaches evolving over time. 
Evaluating science is complex, challenging to test and at times difficult to convey to a lay audience. 
There is an inherent risk that opinions given in evidence may sound more definitive than they 
actually are and hence be less reliable to the tribunal of fact. 
Failure to acknowledge uncertainties are a common failing of forensic disciplines.  The report 
“Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States” published in 2009 recognised the problems of 
error in forensic evidence involving the forensic sciences
3
.  For forensic evidence to be admissible in 
criminal trials and be considered as reliable, depends on the extent to which the forensic discipline is 
founded on a reliable scientific method giving it the capacity to accurately analyse evidence and 
report findings
3
.  This report highlighted the issue that in particular, forensic disciplines relying on 
human interpretation could be tainted by error and introduce bias through the absence of sound 
operational procedures or robust performance standards
3
. Bias and other cognitive influences 
unconsciously affect hard-working, honest and dedicated forensic experts, creeping in without the 
expert’s awareness.  This is a difficult and interesting problem and applicable across all forensic 
domains of medico-legal practice. 
Forensic medicine is an interpretative science, which is less objective than analytical sciences such as 
DNA analysis. It requires the forensic expert to synthesise elements of experience, descriptive 
studies, clinical trials, meta-analyses and apply this knowledge to one patient to determine injury 
plausibility.  In addition to scientific knowledge, clinical experience is also valued.   Experts must 
recognise and manage uncertainty including conceptual uncertainty of central issues of injury 
causation then apply what is known to a concrete scenario. The scientific knowledge basis relevant 
to evaluating suspicious childhood injury is broad, spanning many disciplines including pathology, 
biomechanics, paediatric medicine, orthopaedics and radiology.  Paediatricians have expertise in 
understanding disease in children, normal health and development and in the diagnosis of injuries in 
childhood.   
In cases involving allegations of child abuse, judges have historically been critical of experts they 
perceived had sacrificed objectivity for advocacy by having an investment in a ‘side’
4, 5
. Police have 
sometimes questioned the ability of a forensic physician assessing sexual assault victims to remain 
objective and not to overly identify with the victim
6
.  
In high profile cases involving allegations of child abuse there has been intense media exposure 
debating the reliability of medical evidence given in these proceedings, and in particular the 
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diagnosis of “shaken baby syndrome”.  Law review journals, popular magazines and online scientific 
forums have been devoted to publishing papers, articles and debates on this topic and in particular 
focused the spotlight on the possibility that the medical evidence relied on by the courts in 
successful convictions may be fundamentally flawed
7-10
.  Within published peer-reviewed medical 
literature there has significant attention and debate about biases presented by defense experts 
relating to what have been referred to as  ‘unique theories of causation’ such as the Unified 
Hypothesis
11
 and Temporary Brittle Bone Disease
12
 which have lacked scientific support yet been 
offered as explanations for findings that are generally accepted as derived from inflicted trauma 
mechanisms
13-15
. The biases of these experts are thought to be in the direction of concluding a 
natural explanation rather than objectively considering harm and have been subject to judicial 
rebuke
16
. 
Media scrutiny involving allegations of child abuse have extended to Government Inquiries and 
professional regulatory bodies examining perceived biases in experts involved in these legal 
proceedings
2, 17, 18
. In Ontario, Canada during the Goudge Inquiry, the Commissioner discussed what 
was referred to as a “think dirty” cultural practice amongst forensic pathologists, derived from 
having an excessive index of suspicion of child abuse during the investigation of unexplained infant 
deaths
19
.  Goudge considered this perspective biased the pathology opinions given in court 
proceedings. During the Inquiry the Commissioner heard from various experts of the unstable or 
uncertain knowledge in many of the key forensic issues relating to infant death.   In contrast to the 
many Inquiries that had preceded it which had demanded professionals err on the side of safety, 
Goudge observed that such an approach may potentially generate unacceptable risks elsewhere in 
the legal process, and in particular risked miscarriages of justice
20
.   
CAUSES OF BIAS: PUBLISHED RESEARCH  
Cognitive biases 
In medical diagnosis, clinicians experience a cyclical interplay between pre-existing schema, which 
are the mental categories constructed from experience and belief that provide the framework for 
perception, reasoning and uptake of new information
21
.  Medical curricula that is schema-
structured, that is, grouped by relevant clinical and patho-physiologic variables, enables knowledge 
to be stored in a clinically relevant way
22
.  This encourages ‘forward reasoning’ based on clinical data 
rather than the less efficient and more unreliable ‘backward reasoning’ which starts with a 
hypothetical diagnosis then seeks clues in the history/examination to support it
22
.   
Generally speaking in medicine, cognitive errors that can lead to misdiagnosis include the following 
types:  
Premature closure /anchoring: This involves failing to appreciate there is more to know before 
forming a view, possibly from faulty data gathering or failing to revise diagnosis in light of new 
information.  
‘Tunnel vision’: This involves seeing an incident from a personal perspective or through a narrow 
lens.   
Faulty context generation: Referred to as context bias, this refers to the significance of findings as 
dependent on the context it is thought to exist in.  In Carol Jenny’s landmark study of missed abusive 
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head trauma (AHT) cases, Jenny found missed abusive head trauma was more frequent in children 
who were white or were insured, highlighting biases related to psycho-social contextual factors
23
.  
Other researchers have shown socio-economic status (SES) had more effect on paediatricians 
conclusion of abuse than race despite identical histories
24, 25
.  Radiology is a good example of how 
context can alter findings.  A forensic approach to reporting imaging should not take the alleged 
history into account but instead be restricted to identifying then interpreting radiological findings to 
construct a differential diagnosis of cause.  
Flawed heuristics. This involves the “pattern recognition” approach to diagnosis which may be 
erroneous, over-inclusive and have inherent “blindspots” which may lead to diagnostic error (see 
Box 1- The Cognitive Continuum). 
Social drivers. The term “Groupthink” has been coined to represent a strong compulsion within 
certain groups to reach unanimous decisions.  Although reaching a unanimous decision may be seen 
as useful, it is problematic when the goal to reach consensus compromises objectivity. This process 
clearly operates in jury decisions and has been identified as the cause of erroneous convictions
26
. 
Social drivers underpin the mechanism, such as feeling intimidated or wanting to conform or giving 
deference to those with perceived seniority/greater expertise. 
Hindsight bias involves retrospective suspicion that was not present initially in light of new findings.   
This exists in radiology reporting, overlapping with outcome bias which arises when, following 
awareness of new findings, greater significance is assigned to findings that in isolation were not at 
the time considered to be of significance
27
. 
Terminological issues 
The language used in documentation and in medico-legal reports is critical in communicating 
medico-legal opinion which must be understood in the way intended by the expert
28
. To explore this 
issue in the context of suspicious childhood injury, research has been undertaken using scripted 
cases which required appointed experts to define the ‘child physical abuse likelihood’.  Results from 
these studies identified broad variation in the assigned conclusions between experts assessing the 
same cases
29-32
.  One study observed clustering of responses at the ends of the decision spectrum 
(‘definite inflicted’, ‘definite unintentional’) in expert responses, with much fewer participants 
classifying the cases as ‘uncertain’ from the data supplied
29
.  Research of this type has exposed some 
of the practical difficulties experienced by forensic specialists in communicating opinion.  Some 
participants noted the requirement in the study to classify cases using the terms ‘unintentional’, 
‘accidental’, ‘abusive’, which required consideration of intent to be problematic due to inherent 
subjectivity and potentially trespassed into judicial decision-making. These participants were aware 
the term chosen may significantly influence legal decision-making
30
.  
Adversarial bias/allegiance 
In colloquial terms this type of bias has been referred to as the issue of the “hired gun”.  It is possible 
that lawyers retained to represent a client may choose experts that have pre-existing attitudes that 
favour their client.  It is also possible that lawyers may choose only to call experts with the most 
favourable findings to testify in court, which are both selection effects.  These factors are outside 
the control of the medical expert. Experts may, once retained and promised payment form opinions 
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that favour one side which is referred to as allegiance effects. This bias is within the control of the 
forensic expert.    
To test whether such biases exist using an experimental study design controlling for chance, random 
measurement error or pre-existing differences between groups forensic psychologists were 
recruited to determine risk of future offending for scripted cases
33
.  Even without selection effects, 
the “pull” of adversarial allegiance was clearly shown to influence the experts’ opinions.   The 
researchers opined that in real cases such “pull” may be greater than the experimental conditions 
which was restricted to provision of only a written opinion and limited contact with the lawyer, 
suggesting the amount of contact the expert has with the solicitor as a key factor operating in 
allegiance effects. In this study, the exact source of bias could not be actually defined but may have 
been derived from a sense of team loyalty, monetary payment or promise of future work.  Such 
biases may be more pronounced in disciplines that involve greater subjective clinical judgement. 
Confirmation bias 
Julius Caesar famously once said: “Men generally believe quite freely what they want to be true”.  
Modern cognitive scientists refer to this as confirmation bias, the tendency to test a hypothesis by 
looking for instances that confirm it rather than by searching for potentially falsifying instances.  
Psychological research has identified a number of factors relevant to reliability which influence how 
people tend to seek, perceive, interpret and create new evidence in ways that verify their pre-
existing beliefs
34
.  An observers expectations can impact on visual and auditory perception.  Globally 
these factors are referred to as “observer effects” in social psychology and research methodology, 
involving “expectation” and “suggestion” which are susceptible to extraneous influences such as 
emotional context, expectation and motivation
35
.  Within the forensic sciences these factors are 
considered highly relevant, in particular in forensic science practices utilising subjective human 
judgment as their primary instrument rather than those based on techniques derived from empirical 
scientific methods
21
.  
Confirmation biases are a natural and automatic feature of human cognition that can occur in the 
absence of self-interest and operate without conscious awareness.   Forensic examiners are aware 
of, and trained to avoid physical contamination to protect the integrity of evidence, yet 
“psychological contamination” has not received similar attention and is considered by some to be 
widespread in the forensic sciences
3
.   Applying this concept to child protection assessments, this 
involves the influence of what is already considered by other professionals as suspicious to anchor 
the forensic/child protection paediatrician’s own conclusion.  This may inadvertently lead to 
selective filtering of other information that becomes available at a later time which may have 
relevance to alternative causes of the findings. 
Contextual bias 
Having excess knowledge beyond what is required to carry out a scientific analytical task can 
inadvertently influence how objective data may be interpreted.  Classic psychological research on 
primacy, expectancy effect and observer effects have all shown that context can taint peoples 
perceptions, judgments and behaviours
34
. Despite DNA being once regarded as objective and 
immune to subjectivity and bias, it has been clearly shown that context can influence interpretation 
of DNA evidence using a variety of experimental methodologies including identification of 
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contradicting decisions by the same expert with experimental manipulation of context
36-38
.  In 
particular, interpreting complex situations such as DNA mixtures relies on human examiners making 
a variety of subjective judgements that are susceptible to bias
37
.  Contextual biases which can taint 
the experts conclusions can all potentially be introduced through receiving direct communication 
from police, or from cross-communication amongst examiners involved in a case 
37
. In suspicious 
childhood injury, it has been shown that the approach to investigation of a presenting symptom such 
as bruising may vary depending on the specialty domain of the medical expert
39
.  A subspecialist is 
more likely to consider a rare condition as a possibility than a generalist
40
.  Pathologists generate 
different opinions from the same findings as paediatricians regarding the likelihood of abuse
30
.   
In the US following the development of the new child protection board specialty, there was debate 
as to whether it should be called ‘forensic pediatrics’ or ‘child abuse pediatrics’.  This represented 
differing views as to whether role of the child protection paediatrician should include their own 
evaluation of the family as a basis for forensic medical opinion. The philosophy of the paediatrician 
can influence how consultation notes are documented in the medical record 
41
. Classifying child 
protection paediatrician models of assessment from reviewing medical documentation using the 
terms ‘Base model’, ‘Investigative model’, and ‘Family-dynamic model,’ Keenan and Campbell 
queried whether using an investigative model may blur boundaries between diagnosis and 
investigation or legal decision-making involving other professionals. These authors opined that the 
family dynamic model contains data that may be relevant to risk which inform the needs of the 
family but should not be considered as diagnostic of causation of injury. As a limitation of this study, 
it could not determine if the approach adopted by the paediatrician impacted on medical diagnosis, 
investigative responses or legal outcomes. 
Professor David in the UK had previously published a caution for child protection paediatricians that 
by including risk factors for abuse as a basis for medical forensic opinions, this may potentially bias 
the reader of the report of apparently maladaptive parental responses as suggestive of guilt. 
42
.  
MANAGEMENT OF BIAS: PUBLISHED GUID LINES FOR PRACTICE 
Managing patient advocacy bias: Other forensic specialities have recognised that experts with 
treatment responsibilities should be separate from the experts who have a forensic responsibility to 
the courts.  In mental health proceedings, forensic psychiatrists are considered more objective than 
the treating doctor who may be inadvertently biased towards their patient
41, 43
.  This draws attention 
to the importance within institutions of creating a clear separation between specialists with forensic 
functions from those with treating responsibilities.  
Managing terminological biases: In the report “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States” 
the authors recommended that forensic experts adopt standardised terminology in reporting on, 
and testifying about, the results of forensic science investigations including scales to communicate 
their strength of opinion
3
.  This was also echoed by Goudge during the Goudge Inquiry which also 
recognised that language introduced bias in communicating evidence to the tribunal of fact and 
recommended it as a priority area for scientific development to be adopted across all forensic 
disciplines
19, 20
. 
Managing cognitive biases: The Goudge Report also noted that many forensic disciplines lack best 
practices or any coherent structure for the enforcement of operating standards, certification and 
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accreditation
19
.   It signalled the need as a priority for oversight and enforcement of operating 
standards, certification, accreditation and ethical standards to be developed in the forensic sciences.  
The report also recommended that research should be undertaken to determine the effects of 
contextual bias in forensic practices and research on sources of human error should be closely linked 
with research conducted to quantify and characterise the amount of error.  In addition it 
recommended professional organisations should develop standard operating procedures to 
minimise to the greatest extent possible, potential bias and sources of human error within forensic 
practice. 
PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EVALUATION OF SUSPICIOUS CHILDHOOD INJURY  
This section summarises individual and systemic practices that I consider useful in the forensic 
assessment of suspicious childhood injury to mitigate bias compromising objectivity of forensic 
opinions: 
1. Separate forensic assessments from advocacy in child protection: There are inherent risks that 
employment in a child protection service may inadvertently cultivate a proscetorial bias in 
childhood injury assessment.   This could relate to perceptions of membership as part of the 
investigative team.  An implicit bias in assessment may be towards concluding abuse at the 
expense of objective consideration of an alternative plausible explanation.  Working in a child 
protection setting involves clinical responsibilities which incorporate advocacy for prevention of 
harm at either a primary level through public health and education initiatives or at a secondary 
level by aiming to prevent further harm for already maltreated children through clinical work 
and interagency discussions. The assessment framework required for these tasks in child 
protection should be clearly separated from the framework used for forensic evaluation of 
findings considered suspicious of harm. 
2. Separate treatment from forensic evaluation in assessment of suspicious childhood injury.  In 
child protection it is useful to have distinct separation between the paediatricians responsible 
for the clinical care of patients and the child protection paediatricians who are responsible for 
providing forensic opinion to investigating authorities. It is acknowledged however that this may 
not be possible outside of large tertiary paediatric institutions. 
3. Restrict opinion to consideration of biomechanics of injury and injury plausibility: Restricting 
injury interpretation to biomechanical factors of force, mechanism of injury and issues of timing 
alongside using more precise terms to define the relationship between a potential explanation 
and observed findings such ‘possible’, ‘plausible’, or ‘probable’ is less ambiguous to the 
professionals who are required to respond to forensic opinions
20, 44
. Keep an open mind that is 
independent of SES factors and incorporating psycho-social factors into the basis of forensic 
opinion.  Leave the family assessment to other professionals involved. Whilst the presence of 
risk factors does not, and should not, result in a conclusion of abuse, their presence should 
inform decision-making and planning in the setting of uncertainty
20, 44
.  If they are included in a 
report to inform relevant authorities of risk, the paediatrician should explicitly state they have 
not been used as a basis of opinion. Do not trespass into the ultimate issue as to whether or not 
the child has been abused or presume issues of intent.  At the end of the forensic medical 
assessment it may be that a matter remains unresolved or inadequately explained.  It is 
reasonable to then highlight the ongoing risk of future harm for the child which requires careful 
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professional assessment and risk management. It may also be reasonable to draw parallels to 
findings in the case that are similar to those involving inflicted mechanisms from existing 
literature. Do not base opinions of stated injury causation solely on population research.  
Epidemiological research is helpful to identify suspicion but forensic assessment beyond that 
point (ie. matters subject to investigation) require consideration of individual factors operating 
in a specific injury event which limits generalisability from epidemiological research
20
. Avoid 
subjective/emotive descriptors and use non-judgemental language in medical 
records/documentation and in medico-legal reports.   
4. Adopt a process of active construction of differential diagnoses for individual findings:  Using 
and teaching a standardised model using hypothetico-deductive reasoning for forensic 
assessment of findings considered suspicious of harm will generate ‘forward-thinking’ rather 
than reliance on heuristics which involve increased risk of error.  Having trainees slow down and 
‘think aloud’ when formulating forensic opinions about suspicious injury may be a useful 
mechanism to reduce risks of diagnostic bias from faulty heuristics which is of benefit to the 
teacher and the learner alike. Adopt a forensic approach to reporting imaging of cases subject to 
child protection investigations that focuses on identification of findings and constructing a 
differential diagnosis rather than reaching a definitive conclusion about abuse. Tunnel vision 
may be countered by engaging in critical thinking and using systematic consideration of 
alternatives.  
5. Recognise and safely manage uncertainty within the timeline of forensic investigation: The 
extent of forensic opinion required varies depending on the stage at which the expert is asked to 
contribute an opinion.  In an Emergency Department the relevant task for the doctor assessing 
the child is to determine if the findings are considered suspicious of harm, which may initiate a 
criminal and child protection investigation.  For a forensic/child protection paediatrician 
subsequently involved, opinion is typically restricted to determining if the initial suspicion of 
harm is resolved or sustained after forensic medical assessment has been completed, in relation 
to a matter still subject at that point to ongoing investigation. This opinion is typically issued as 
an interim report to guide child protection professionals regarding immediate safety/placement 
decisions and may also be used by investigating police to initiate their criminal investigation
20
.   
Further opinion may be required at a later time using information derived from advanced or 
completed police and statutory investigations.   By virtue of experience, some forensic 
paediatricians may be requested to undertake case reviews of matters subject to investigation 
where they have not been directly involved.  In these cases the investigation is typically 
complete, remains unresolved and is now subject to a legal process. Medico-legal opinion in the 
form of a report may be restricted to opinion on specific issues allowing expansion/justification 
for opinion which may be in greater detail than what was provided by doctors who were directly 
involved. Pre-trial discussions are useful to ensure evidence is understood and accurately 
conveyed. 
6. Incorporate psychology into training in forensic medicine: Forensic medical education and 
certification should include training in psychology that is relevant to forensic work such as 
experimental methods, aspects of perception, judgment, decision-making and social influence. 
Expanding on experimental research exploring biases in child protection assessments is also 
much needed. 
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7. Adopt a high level of self-awareness in conducting child protection assessments. Identify your 
own individual biases and actively consider the opposite to enhance objectivity. Remain 
independent of parties that request opinions. Demand all information is made available for 
review before offering an opinion.  Increase involvement in reviewing your own evidence and 
providing statements of limitations.  
8. Gain experience in giving evidence for both legal sides in cases involving allegations of child 
abuse. Develop objective criteria for defining agreement to undertake cases if you have not 
been directly involved, regardless of whether the request is from prosecution or defense.  It is 
important for paediatricians employed in child protection services to enable access for defense 
to seek forensic opinions if appropriately qualified. Educate experts and the legal profession that 
by agreeing to provide an opinion, there should be no obligation that it will necessarily support a 
case.  It may help narrow issues for a subsequent trial, or even enable a matter to be resolved 
prior to trial if both sides agree on key issues. 
9. Have peer review mechanisms in place, within and external to the institution.  
10. Ensure strong leadership qualities in peer review processes and case discussions.  This requires 
a group leader who is participative rather than directive/authoritarian in style, combined with 
high level skills in recognising and managing negative group dynamics. Seek to disprove opinions 
by incorporating a devils advocate into case discussions to minimise “groupthink” factors 
operating. 
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Box 1:   The Cognitive Continuum. 
 
Heuristics: mental short-cuts, sometimes referred to as “rules of thumb”, used to arrive 
at a diagnosis, based on pattern recognition and experience. It is intuitive, influenced by 
recency, bypasses consciousness and may be error-prone due to inherent “blindspots”.  
Heuristics are readily available, fast and most commonly used in clinical practice.  
 
Hypothetico-deductive reasoning: development of a broad differential diagnosis.  This 
diagnostic method is slower, more commonly used by novices and taught in medical 
pedagogy.   
 
Typically, experienced clinicians flexibly use both intuitive and hypothetico-deductive 
methods for clinical reasoning. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Highlights 
 
1. Forensic experts must safely manage uncertainties when interpreting 
medical evidence. 
 
2. Cognitive and contextual biases can influence reliability of expert opinion. 
 
 
3. Forensic paediatricians can provide opinion for prosecution or defense if 
qualified. 
 
4. Forensic assessment must be differentiated from advocacy in medical 
child protection. 
 
 
5. Medical opinion should be restricted to biomechanics and injury 
plausibility. 
